Beyond the Barbed Wire Due to ISIS: Experiences of Children of Third-Country Nationals in North-East Syria Detention Camps – An Analysis Informed by a Self-Witness

Beyond the Barbed Wire Due to ISIS: Experiences of Children of Third-Country Nationals in North-East Syria Detention Camps – An Analysis Informed by a Self-Witness

By Tahir Ali Shah

From 2013 to 2019, the so-called Islamic State (ISIS) attracted tens of thousands of foreign recruits worldwide. By late 2015, an estimated 30,000 foreign fighters from over 85 countries had traveled to Syria and Iraq to join ISIS. Most came from the Middle East and North Africa, but significant numbers also came from Europe, North America, Central Asia and Southeast Asia Link. Motivations varied, ISIS’s aggressive online propaganda portrayed an idealized “caliphate,” promising ideological fulfillment, community belonging and adventure. Many recruits were driven by extremist ideology or sectarian grievances, while others cited personal or social reasons. Some were attracted by war spoils or the status of joining a rising movement, whereas others responded to peer networks or perceived state failure. Interestingly, people from other countries weren't just hired because their home countries were poor. A surprisingly large number of these workers came from richer countries.

The foreign fighters presented a global challenge. U.N. Security Council resolutions 2178 of 2014 and 2396 of 2017) and numerous intelligence studies warned of the “army-in-waiting” risk posed by returning ISIS members. Indeed, some ISIS veterans (e.g. Abdelhamid Abaaoud of the 2015 Paris attacks) returned to their home countries and mounted terrorist plots. As ISIS lost territory from late 2017 through 2019 (e.g. Raqqa, Hajin), armies fighting ISIS (primarily the U.S.-supported Syrian Democratic Forces, SDF) captured tens of thousands of families of foreign fighters, namely foreign women and children, along with the fighters themselves. Men of fighting age were generally separated into prisons, while women and children were held in makeshift camps under SDF control. These foreigners, often called “Third Country Nationals” (TCNs), now number in the tens of thousands in North-East NE Syria.

Third Country Nationals in NE Syria: Countries of Origin and Numbers

TCNs held in Northeast Syria come from at least 57 countries, spanning all inhabited continents Link. They include nationals of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Germany, India, Iran, Nigeria, Russia, Türkiye, the UK, the USA, and many others (see list in the Special Rapporteur’s report here. U.N. experts and NGOs commonly cite over 57 countries of origin, and media accounts similarly note ISIS families from Europe, Asia, Africa and the Americas. The diversity of nationalities has raised diplomatic challenges for repatriation.

Third Country Nationals (TCNs) in Northeast Syria Camps & Prisons (Early 2025 - Midpoint Estimates)

Category / Location	Estimated Number (Mid-point Average)	Notes & Further Breakdown
I. Al-Hol & Roj Camps	~11,500	This represents the foreign national population within the two main camps, primarily in the "Annex" section of Al-Hol and Roj Camp.
Women (TCNs in Camps)	~4,000	Adult female relatives of alleged ISIS members.
Children (TCNs in Camps) <18	~7,500	The largest demographic. Many are under 12; a significant number were born in the camps. Comprises both boys and girls. (Precise boy/girl split not available).
Men (TCNs in Camps)	~50	Very few adult foreign men are held in the main sections of Al-Hol and Roj camps. Any adult males here are typically Syrian or Iraqi. This is a very small indicative number.
II. SDF Detention Facilities / Prisons (TCNs Only)	~2,550	This specifically refers to foreign national males detained for alleged ISIS affiliation.
Men (TCNs in Prisons)	~2,550	Adult foreign males alleged to be ISIS fighters. Held in high-security prisons separate from the camps.
Boys (Adolescent TCNs in Juvenile Detention)	~200	Older boys (typically 12-18) who are separated from their mothers in camps and held in specialized juvenile detention/rehabilitation centers. Some may later be moved to prisons.
III. Total TCNs Across All Facilities	~14,000	This is the approximate total number of Third Country Nationals across both the camps (women & children) and the prisons (men & older boys).

 

By nationality, Iraq has repatriated the largest number of its nationals (nearly 2,850 children returned), hrw.org. Beyond Iraq, about 35 other governments have accepted only about 1,600 foreign children to date, hrw.org. High-profile examples of repatriations include Central Asian and Balkan states: e.g. Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kosovo, Albania and Kyrgyzstan have each flown back dozens or hundreds of women and children over the past few years, icct.nl. Western nations have been slower; for instance, Canada has repatriated only a handful of children, and countries like the UK and France long resisted full-scale returns (though some children have eventually been brought back). On the other hand, some governments stripped citizenship or refused to acknowledge these nationals, effectively leaving them in legal limbo (this statelessness issue is discussed below).

Detention Conditions and Camp Locations

The majority of TCNs are held in large camps in Syria’s northeast, under the authority of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), backed by the Kurdish-led SDF. The main camps are al-Hol (Hasakah governorate) and Roj (near Qamishli). Smaller sites include Ain Issa and Al-Shaddadi. These facilities are often called “IDP camps,” but on the ground they function more like open-air prisons: detainees cannot freely leave or re-enter, and security is tight ecoi.net. The Special Rapporteur notes that “nomenclature of ‘camp, is entirely inappropriate to describe what is in fact an open prison for those arbitrarily and indefinitely detained”ecoi.net.

Women gather outside a small market shop in the al-Hol camp since October 2019. The scene illustrates the makeshift nature of the camp, where tent shelters and ramshackle shops serve thousands of detained women and children. Conditions in al-Hol are extremely harsh. The camp is severely overcrowded and was not designed for long-term habitation SCI report. Tents and tarpaulins offer minimal shelter from blistering summers and freezing winters. Reports repeatedly describe dire humanitarian conditions, inadequate housing, limited access to clean water and sanitation, insufficient food, and chronic shortages of medicine and medical SR Technical Visit. Save the Children warns that children in al-Hol face “violence, hardship, deprivation and trauma…every day”. Incidents of violence (including suicide attempts, fires, drownings and attacks by other detainees) occur frequently, and aid workers have documented scores of preventable deaths among camp inmates in recent years.

Repatriation of Children from Northeast Syria (NES) Camps as of May 2025, reflecting the most recent data available:

Country	Est. Citizens in NES	Children Returned	Total Repatriated	Notable Issues/Remarks
Uzbekistan	250+	142+	339	Largest contributor to repatriations; ongoing efforts. The estimated total repatriated from all countries as of 22 July 2024
Kazakhstan	413+	188	719	Accounts for 36% of global returns; proactive repatriation policy. Link
Russia	225+	294	294	Active repatriation policy; significant number of children returned.
Kosovo	80+	74+	242+	Frequent returns; substantial repatriation efforts.
France	270–320	167	223	Increased repatriations since 2022; political resistance remains.
Germany	~180	80	108	Majority of willing nationals repatriated; ongoing assessments.
Sweden	26+ confirmed	27	37	Repatriations ongoing; commitment to returning nationals.
Belgium	44	32	45	Returned children, not always caregivers; continued efforts.
Canada	46	23	32	Repatriated 10 children and 4 women in April 2023; ongoing challengesn Link
Denmark	26	18	22	Revoked citizenship of some mothers; legal challenges persist.
Australia	67	21	25	Political hesitancy; legal appeals for repatriation declined Link
UK	~60	18	21	Citizenship stripping cases (e.g., Shamima Begum); limited repatriations Link
USA	17	17	38	Facilitated repatriation of own and allied nationals; active involvement.

 

Health services are woefully inadequate. The Special Rapporteur observed that “serious ill-health pervades the camp”, especially among women and children, undermining their right to life. Many camp residents report chronic respiratory illnesses (often linked to dust and pollution), gastrointestinal diseases, and unaddressed injuries. Camp medical facilities (run by NGOs and UN agencies) provide only rudimentary care; specialized treatment requires difficult security screening and is rarely approved. Women in al-Hol allege that they must purchase medicines out of pocket despite having no income, forcing them to ration life-saving drugs. The camp’s sanitation is poor, sewage often runs in open channels, and disease outbreaks have periodically struck.

Al-Hol is divided into sections; notably, Annex 3 (often just called “the Annex”) is reserved for hundreds of foreign women and children (mostly non-Arabic speakers) whose nationalities are not Iraqi or Syrian. Access to Annex 3 is highly restricted, and NGOs have limited ability to provide services there. Former detainees report that being held there feels like “a world away” due to language barriers and extra security controls.

By contrast, Roj camp (southwest of Qamishli) is somewhat better organized. The Special Rapporteur noted that internal movement in Roj is freer (no separate annex) and the camp has more order and basic amenities (e.g. shared TV rooms). Roj’s population is smaller (tens of thousands) and likewise majority are women and children. However, Roj still functions as a detention facility. Housing is similarly overcrowded, and residents still face austere living conditions. Language barriers are acute: many Roj detainees speak only Uzbek, Uyghur, Chechen or other tongues, which means they cannot communicate with Arabic-speaking aid workers or doctors. The available health clinic in Roj is only basic primary care, and chronic illnesses among detainees (e.g. high rates of asthma) go largely untreated. Schools or child-focused programs in both camps are very limited; one report found that children in Roj “were only allowed outside for 45 minutes of classes per week,” with no structured curriculum.

Overall, multiple human rights monitors conclude that living conditions in these camps meet the threshold of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. The arbitrary, indefinite detention, extreme heat, inadequate shelter, open sewage and food scarcity “meet the threshold for torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment” under international law. Refugees International and Human Rights Watch likewise describe camps like al-Hol as “a closed tent city of misery” and “open-air prisons” where basic rights are denied.

Legal and Human Rights Challenges

The situation of TCNs in Northeast Syria raises profound legal and human rights issues. Foremost is the question of indefinite detention without due process. Most detainees have never been formally charged or tried; they are held for years simply on the suspicion of ISIS affiliation. This practice violates core human rights norms. The U.N. Special Rapporteur notes that holding children indefinitely “in what appears to be a cradle to grave cycle” breaches multiple treaties, including the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). For example, Article 37 of the CRC prohibits unlawful or arbitrary detention of children, and Article 9 of the ICCPR prohibits arbitrary arrest or detention – all of which are disregarded in these camps. The Special Rapporteur concluded that the detention regime in al-Hol and Roj is “an absolute contravention” of non-derogable rights (such as the right to a name, nationality, and to be treated with dignity). Likewise, Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which applies in this non-international armed conflict – obliges parties to treat all detainees humanely. As the Geneva Academy legal analysis confirms, even non-state actors like the SDF must respect basic IHL and ensure judicial guarantees.

Child protection is especially pressing. Thousands of very young children (80% of the camp children are under the Age of 12) are detained alongside their mothers, but in conditions utterly unsuitable for childhood. No effort is made to determine each child’s best interests. International law (CRC Articles 3, 9, 37) mandates that children be protected from harm and separated only when absolutely necessary; here, children have no judicial review or legal status. SDF authorities have been reported to forcibly separate adolescent boys from their mothers once they reach around age 10–12. Mothers describe their sons being snatched at night with no legal process, causing severe trauma. Human rights lawyers say this appears “distinctly gendered” and unprotected by any law, Report Link. Such arbitrary separation breaches CRC Article 9 (family unity) and could amount to enforced disappearance. Equally, the detention of toddlers and infants born in camp after parents joined ISIS, without alternatives, violates the principle that detention of children should be a last resort. U.N. experts emphasize that each child retains full human rights simply by being a child, regardless of their parents’ actions.

Statelessness and nationality issues are another challenge. Many TCN women had their citizenship stripped (e.g., by the UK, Australia, Saudi Arabia, or others) due to ISIS links. They often left behind without passports in Syria, and some countries now refuse to even recognize them as nationals. International law does not allow states to arbitrarily denationalize people or render them stateless. Customary IHL and U.N. jurisprudence hold that origin states must either repatriate their nationals for trial or facilitate extradition. Withdrawing citizenship in a way that cannot be challenged or causes statelessness is considered arbitrary, and the 1961 Convention on Reduction of Statelessness forbids any measure that would leave an individual stateless. In practice, when Western countries refuse repatriation, their nationals (especially children) become de facto stateless, unable to access rights to nationality or return. The Chicago Journal of Int’l Law notes that such children effectively “become de facto stateless when countries refuse to take them back,” stripping them of fundamental rights. This situation may violate the CRC’s Article 7 (right to a name and nationality).

Gender-based concerns are also significant. Women detainees face heightened vulnerabilities. Reports from camps document instances of sexual and gender-based violence and coercion. Human rights groups stress that international law strictly forbids such abuse. For example, RSI and HRW have interviewed camp women who witnessed rapes, forced marriages or exploitation in custody, though systematic data is hard to obtain. Girls in camps have encountered physical and sexual abuse by other detainees or guards. Pregnant women and mothers with infants, who under U.N. standards must be treated with special care, are sometimes allegedly confined or punished. One mother told RSI that after a camp rule violation, she was further detained and separated from her breastfeeding infant. Denying mothers contact with their babies as a disciplinary action blatantly violates international norms on women prisoners. In short, SDF policies in the camps often discriminate based on sex and religion in unlawful ways.

In sum, the NE Syria detention regime has been characterized by U.N. experts as a system of “mass arbitrary and indefinite detention,” in clear violation of international law. The lack of legal processes, indefinite confinement of children, harsh camp conditions, and reports of abuse together make the situation a grave humanitarian and human rights emergency.

Repatriation Efforts, International Cooperation, and Policy Landscape

A key question is how countries have responded to this crisis. International bodies and rights groups uniformly call for urgent repatriation of foreign nationals, especially children. The U.N. Special Rapporteur appealed to all states of nationality to repatriate their nationals detained in Northeast Syria. Security Council Res. 2396 (2017) similarly urges states to bring back family members of foreign fighters for prosecution or rehabilitation. UNICEF and Human Rights Watch have repeatedly pleaded for accelerated returns, noting that keeping nationals abroad is not a viable counterterrorism policy.

Despite these calls, repatriation has proceeded unevenly. Iraq (once ISIS’s heartland) has shouldered the largest burden, repatriating about 2,850 children to date. A few Central Asian and Balkan states have also moved decisively. For example, Kazakhstan (2019–2020) airlifted hundreds of citizens (primarily women and children) from Syria; Tajikistan and Uzbekistan repatriated dozens in 2019–2021; Kosovo has brought back over 200; Albania over 100; Kyrgyzstan dozens more. France and Germany repatriated small numbers (dozens of children each) and legal frameworks in those countries are now being reviewed to allow more returns. In contrast, many Western democracies were initially reluctant. For instance, Canada took only four children back by 2022, and only agreed to a few more after public pressure. The U.S. repatriated some refugees (e.g., in 2019 and early 2023, dozens of women/children) but still leaves many nationals in Syria.

Barriers to repatriation include security and political concerns: governments fear that some returnees may radicalize others or evade justice. Some demand iron-clad assurances that returning families will be monitored or prosecuted before consenting to their repatriation. Other hurdles are bureaucratic: many detainees lack valid travel documents, and some countries claim they cannot identify their nationals. Citizenship revocations have complicated matters: stateless individuals cannot be sent “home.” Public opinion in many countries has often been hostile to repatriation, pressuring leaders to take a hard line.

However, some policy shifts are emerging. In late 2022 and 2023, there was renewed U.N. and allied emphasis on reintegration. For example, the U.S. Counterterrorism Coordinator has publicly urged allies to take back their citizens. (Repatriation from NE Syria & the Efforts to Counter Violent Extremism)

The European Court of Human Rights (September 2022) ruled that France’s blanket refusal to repatriate its grandchildren held by ISIS violated the children’s human rights, creating pressure creating pressure on European states. UNICEF and others are working on pilot projects to prepare families for return and to support reintegration. NGOs emphasize that reintegration successes often outweigh the risks, and many returnee children adapt well in their home communities.

International cooperation remains limited. There is no centralized global mechanism compelling repatriation. The SDF, overstretched and unpaid for guarding ISIS families, depends on ad-hoc negotiations. International organizations provide humanitarian aid in camps but have no mandate to retrieve nationals. Cold regional politics also intrude: for years, Syrian and Iraqi governments did not actively assist in processing foreign captives. On the positive side, bilateral agreements have enabled some prisoner exchanges (e.g. trade of foreign fighters for hostages). The Global Coalition against “Daesh” has discussed repatriation, but consensus is lacking. Overall, the policy landscape is characterized by slow progress and piecemeal efforts: for every family repatriated, many more remain, essentially abandoned to a limbo in Syria: Repatriations Lag for Foreigners with Alleged ISIS Ties | Human Rights Watch

International Law and Human Rights Conventions

International law addresses many facets of this crisis. In non-international armed conflict, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions requires that all detainees be treated humanely. This prohibits violence, torture, and degrading treatment of persons “not taking an active part” in hostilities (which includes all camp residents, especially women and children). The SDF, despite being a non-state actor, is recognized as having the obligations of a party to conflict; it is bound by both IHL and customary human rights law due to its de facto control. Thus, the absolute ban on torture and cruel treatment (ICCPR Art. 7, CAT) applies. The Nelson Mandela Rules (UN Standard Minimum Rules for Treatment of Prisoners) likewise require minimum standards of detention and access to health and legal process.

The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) is particularly relevant. Every child in these camps has rights that must be upheld “in all circumstances” (CRC Art. 4). These include the right to life (Art. 6) and to protection from neglect or abuse (Art. 19). Article 37 forbids arbitrary detention of children; Article 3 mandates that all actions (by governments or other actors) be in the best interests of the child. None of these safeguards is being met. The forcible separation of mothers and children contravenes Article 9 (right to family unity), and pregnancy-related protections (CRC Art. 24) are ignored. The children’s detention arguably violates even the laws of war.

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) further prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention (Art. 9) and requires fair trial guarantees (Art. 14). Present conditions flout these obligations. The ICCPR also bans discrimination, yet camp policies discriminate by nationality, gender and age (e.g. different rules for men vs. women). Human Rights Committee General Comments underscore that deprivation of nationality that cannot be contested is arbitrary, underscoring states’ duty not to strip citizenship without due process.

Other treaties have importance. The Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (1961) prohibits revoking nationality if it renders a person stateless. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) obliges states to protect women’s rights equally – implying scrutiny of any gender-based segregation in detention. The CAT (Convention Against Torture) bans any act causing severe pain or suffering; arbitrary separation of children or denial of medical care could amount to inhuman treatment.

Finally, U.N. Security Council resolutions on counter-terrorism (e.g. Res. 2396 (2017) and 2732 (2020)) call for “strengthened efforts” to bring foreign fighters and family members under the rule of law, whether by prosecution or reintegration. These resolutions reaffirm that the most effective means to protect states is to either prosecute or repatriate individuals, rather than leaving them in indefinite limbo. In practice, however, these international instruments rely on state cooperation. To date, there is neither universal agreement nor an enforcement mechanism to compel reluctant countries to repatriate. Nevertheless, the legal framework is clear.

Table 1. Selected legal obligations relevant to TCNs in NE Syria (IHL/IHRL and conventions)

Instrument	Key provision	Relevance
Geneva Conventions (I) Common Art. 3	Humane treatment of non-combatants	Binds SDF; prohibits torture and arbitrary detention.
ICCPR (1966) Art. 9,14,26	Rights to liberty, fair trial, non-discrimination	Violated by arbitrary detention, lack of due process.
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) Art. 3,9,37	Best interest, family unity, no cruel treatment	Children’s rights to protection are ignored.
Convention on Torture (1984) Art. 2	Prohibition of torture and CIDT	Conditions may amount to torture (water/shelter deprivation)
Convention on Statelessness (1961) Art. 8	No nationality deprivation causing statelessness	States cannot strip citizenship arbitrarily; children risk statelessness. The Children of ISIS
UNSC Resolutions 2178 (2014), 2396 (2017)	Prevent FTF travel; repatriate families	Call for return & rehabilitation of foreign fighters and families.

 

Overall, third-country families in NE Syria find themselves caught between contradictory obligations, the detaining authorities justify holding them for “security,” while countries of nationality invoke security to avoid repatriation. International law favors returning these people to legal jurisdictions that can adjudicate or rehabilitate them. The current status quo, indefinite detention of thousands with no trial, is legally untenable under IHL, IHRL, and refugee law. The plight of these TCNs remains one of the most complex humanitarian and legal challenges stemming from the ISIS conflict.

About the Author: Tahir Ali Shah is a humanitarian professional with over 20 years of experience managing protection and development programs across South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. He has worked extensively in refugee response, child protection, and humanitarian advocacy. He can be reached at tshaha@gmail.com