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 India-Pakistan Conflict and the Kashmir Crisis: Context and Ceasefire 2025

Overview of the Kashmir Region

The Kashmir region has been a point of contention since the 1947 partition of British India. This partition led to multiple wars and a continuing insurgency, with both India and Pakistan asserting claims over the territory. A 1949 ceasefire established the Line of Control (LoC), dividing Kashmir without resolving its ultimate status. The United Nations, through Security Council Resolutions 47 (1948) and 80 (1950), recommended a free and impartial plebiscite to determine the future of Jammu and Kashmir. However, these resolutions, passed under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, are non-binding recommendations.

Historical Context: Accession and Partition

The partition framework allowed rulers of princely states to accede to either India or Pakistan or remain independent. While the Kashmir Valley held a Muslim majority, the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir initially opted for independence. However, following an invasion by tribal militias from Pakistan, he acceded to India in October 1947. This accession was accepted by the then Governor-General of India, Lord Mountbatten, contingent upon a future reference to the people of Kashmir.

Current Administrative Divisions

Currently, the former princely state is administered by three countries:

Pakistan: Administers Azad Kashmir, with an approximate population of 4.045 million (2017 census), and Gilgit-Baltistan, with around 1.8 million people. Both regions have overwhelmingly Muslim populations.

India: Administers Jammu and Kashmir, estimated to have a population of 12.5 million (2011 census). In this region, the Kashmir Valley has a significant Muslim majority, and the Jammu region has a Hindu majority.

China: China administers two main areas, Aksai Chin, a largely uninhabited, high-altitude region taken control of after the 1962 China-India War due to its strategic importance for connecting Xinjiang and Tibet, and the Shaksgam Valley (Trans-Karakoram Tract), ceded to China by Pakistan in a 1963 border agreement not recognized by India, which claims the entire former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir; these China-administered areas, particularly Aksai Chin, are sparsely populated with limited reliable census data, primarily consisting of Chinese military and administrative personnel who use Mandarin, the official language of China, although Uyghur and Tibetan may also be present to a limited extent due to the administration of these areas as part of Xinjiang and Tibet, while Kashmiri is not spoken in these regions but is concentrated in the Kashmir Valley and parts of Pakistan-administered Kashmir.

Special Status and its Revocation: The special status for Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir was granted under Article 370 of the Constitution of India, as a result of negotiations following the 1947 accession. This article provided the region with considerable autonomy, including its constitution and flag. However, this special status was revoked by India on August 5, 2019, through a Presidential Order and the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019. This act also bifurcated the state into the Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir, and Ladakh.

In Pakistan-administered Kashmir, the status evolved differently. Azad Kashmir's distinct status is rooted in its establishment in 1947 and formalized by the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act of 1974, which provides for self-governance while maintaining significant oversight from Pakistan. Gilgit-Baltistan's status developed from initial direct Pakistani administration to increasing autonomy, particularly through the Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order 2009, though it does not have the status of a full Pakistani province. The special arrangements in Pakistan-administered Kashmir thus emerged through local developments and subsequent administrative and constitutional frameworks influenced by Pakistan.

Recent militant attacks and border strikes brought the rivals perilously close to war. In April 2025, a militant assault on tourists in Pahalgam (Kashmir) killed 26 and triggered unprecedented Indian counterstrikes across the LoC. Islamabad and Delhi exchanged threats, suspended treaties and closed crossings, raising fears of nuclear confrontation.

Domestic politics and regional instability fueled the crisis. Pakistan’s disputed 2022 election left rival parties deadlocked and protests on the streets. A hardline crackdown on Afghan refugees (500,000+ expelled since 2023 added to social strains. India, heading into elections, faced nationalist pressure to respond forcefully.

A U.S.-brokered ceasefire in mid-May 2025 ended the fighting but is fragile. Both sides agreed to stop hostilities under international pressure. The International Crisis Group (ICG) analysts warn that without confidence-building measures, the truce may only be temporary. India and Pakistan should prioritize de-escalation and dialogue (with U.S./international facilitation), prevent militant proxies from triggering new clashes, and address the roots of Kashmiri discontent (e.g. by scheduling overdue local elections). International actors (U.S., China, UN) must press both sides to renormalize relations, resume talks, and uphold bilateral agreements.

Historical Background: Kashmir and Rivalry

The India-Pakistan conflict dates to the 1947 Partition of British India, which created Muslim-majority Pakistan and Hindu-majority India. Kashmir, a Muslim-majority princely state, became the flashpoint when its Hindu ruler acceded to India, prompting the first Indo-Pak war (1947–48). A UN-negotiated ceasefire line (the Line of Control) froze that war. Despite subsequent wars in 1965 and 1971, Kashmir’s status remained unresolved. India’s 1972 Simla Agreement formalized the LoC and committed both sides to peaceful dialogue, but cross-border skirmishes have continued regularly.

The 1972 Simla Agreement was a peace treaty signed between India and Pakistan on July 2nd, 1972, in Simla, India, following the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War which resulted in the creation of Bangladesh. Signed by Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Pakistani President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, it aimed to normalize relations and establish a framework for peaceful resolution of disputes through bilateral negotiations, notably without third-party intervention. The agreement also converted the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir into the Line of Control (LoC), which both sides agreed to respect without unilateral alteration, though it was not recognized as an international border.

The 1999 Kargil War and the 2008 Mumbai terror attack were among high points of violence. Relations warmed briefly in 2014–2015, with Indian PM Modi inviting Pakistan’s leader to his inauguration, but talks collapsed that summer and ties soured again.

In August 2019, the Modi government abruptly revoked Kashmir’s semi-autonomous status (Article 370), splitting the state into two federally governed union territories. The assembly was dissolved, a federal governor was installed, and hundreds of local leaders and activists were detained. This measure, intended to integrate Kashmir, instead generated intense resentment among Kashmiris. Security was tightened (curfews, communications blackouts) and protests flared. The deep sense of alienation created a fertile ground for renewed militancy. Indian security forces in Srinagar stood guard amid clashes with protesters in Kashmir.

After 2019, the Indian government pushed for development projects in Kashmir, but many locals felt politically sidelined. A senior Indian official acknowledged that “punitive action alone can’t bring peace” and urged offering “carrots” to Kashmiri youths. Despite occasional talks, New Delhi has repeatedly delayed promised regional elections in Jammu & Kashmir, citing security. In December 2023, India’s Supreme Court ordered elections by September 2024. As of May 2025, those polls had not been held, leaving elected representation absent in Kashmir and frustration simmering among its population. barcelonaradical.net.

Political Context in India and Pakistan

Pakistan: The country’s fraught politics and economy set the stage for instability. A February 8, 2024 general election brought Shehbaz Sharif’s coalition to power, but Imran Khan’s PTI party rejected the results, alleging rigging. Widespread protests and street confrontations persisted into 2025. The fragile government faced a grave economic crisis (inflation, debt) and recurring security challenges (militant attacks within Pakistan). Institutional trust was low: “all elected institutions had credibility at stake” amid a standoff between rival power camps. plusec.org.

Another major stress was the government’s policy toward Afghan refugees. By early 2025 Pakistan had forcibly expelled hundreds of thousands of Afghans, ignoring international calls to respect their rights. Rights groups estimate 500,000–800,000 Afghans were driven out since late 2023. Islamabad argued that many refugees, including Taliban-linked fighters, posed a security threat. However, the repatriations also displaced people into Pakistan’s northwest, disrupted local economies, and drew legal challenges from courts temporarily halting evictions. ICG experts had previously warned that such expulsions “gain little but risk much harm”. Overall, political gridlock and an influx of displaced people strained Pakistan’s capacity to manage security and public order, reducing space for attention to Kashmir. crisisgroup.org

India: Prime Minister Modi’s ruling BJP secured another term in mid-2024 general elections, cementing a Hindu nationalist agenda. Modi’s government, in power since 2014, has adopted a tough stance on terrorism and Kashmir. The consensus pressure after the April 2025 terror attack was on holding Pakistan accountable. In parallel, India’s regional elections (which included Jammu & Kashmir seats) saw the BJP campaigning hard to win local votes. On the international front, India also expanded its outreach to major powers, including close ties with the U.S. (with visits by Vice President Vance to India and PM Modi to USA) to cement the strategic partnerships in the Indo-Pacific.

However, cracks appeared. Some analysts note that the BJP had sought to delay Kashmir’s regional polls to avoid risking defeat before national elections. Local civil society and opposition parties argued that postponement of elections undermined Kashmiris’ political voice and increased resentment, which militant groups could exploit.

Trigger Event: The April 2025 Pahalgam Attack

On 22 April 2025, a heavily-armed militant squad attacked tourists in Pahalgam, a tourist spot in Kashmir. They separated and executed non-Muslim men (mostly Hindu) at point-blank range, killing 26 and wounding over two dozen. It was Kashmir’s deadliest militant strike in decades. The brutality of the massacre, captured on camera, provoked a national outrage in India. Both Kashmiris and other Indian citizens condemned it; Kashmiri leaders of all stripes joined a rare communal vigil and shutdown to protest the killings. The victims were identified mainly as civilians, contradicting claims that they were paramilitary.

In Delhi and across India, the attack intensified calls for retaliation. Prime Minister Modi immediately returned from Saudi Arabia for an emergency cabinet meeting, and Home Minister Amit Shah flew to Kashmir to meet victims’ families. Modi vowed to “identify, track and punish every terrorist and their backers”, language widely interpreted as aimed at Pakistan-backed militants. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh hinted at targeting those “behind the scenes” of the attack. India then announced punitive measures. It suspended the Indus Waters Treaty and shut the Khokhrapar crossing with Pakistan. The Indus Waters Treaty, signed in 1960, is a water-sharing agreement between India and Pakistan for the Indus River system. It allocated the eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) to India and the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) to Pakistan, with India permitted limited use of the western rivers for specific purposes like power generation without significantly affecting the flow to Pakistan. The treaty has generally survived periods of conflict, but recent escalations have put it under severe strain. India announced the suspension of the treaty, citing Pakistan's alleged support for cross-border terrorism. This unprecedented move has been met with strong condemnation from Pakistan, with its Prime Minister stating that any attempt to block or divert water would be considered an "act of war." The suspension raises serious concerns about potential disruptions to Pakistan's agriculture, which heavily relies on the Indus waters, and its hydropower generation. While some experts believe India currently lacks the infrastructure for immediate large-scale diversion, the move is a significant escalation, turning a crucial resource-sharing agreement into a tool of diplomatic pressure and raising fears of severe economic and social consequences for Pakistan. The World Bank, a guarantor of the treaty, has emphasized that the treaty cannot be unilaterally suspended, further complicating the situation and highlighting the dangerous intersection of water politics and bilateral conflict.

Pakistan’s response was mixed. The government expressed condolences to the victims’ families but stopped short of condemning the attack outright. Pakistani leaders insisted it was a homegrown backlash against New Delhi’s Kashmir policies, denying any state complicity. Defence Minister Asif and other officials emphasized that Pakistan supported Kashmiris’ right to self-determination and blamed India’s actions for fomenting resistance. Street protests erupted in parts of Pakistan; some activists burnt Indian flags and called for retribution, while moderate voices cautioned restraint.

Regionally, the timing of the attack coincided with U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance’s visit to India, guaranteeing global headlines. President Trump and the U.S. vice president both contacted Modi to offer condolences. World powers quickly voiced concern. However, the attack set a confrontation in motion: within hours, Indian forces and Pakistani forces began exchanging fire across the Line of Control. By 24 April, intense shelling by both sides was reported, causing civilian casualties on both sides of Kashmir. Indian fighter jets strike alleged militant bases (Operation Sindhoor) inside Pakistan-administered Kashmir, and other settled areas, in what Delhi called a “surgical strike” on nine locations, including shelling and a surprise strike on Pakistan’s strategic Nur Khan air base near Rawalpindi (reportedly using drones and missiles).

For four days, tensions reached their peak since 2019. Pakistan’s nuclear command convened an emergency session, and Indian air defenses were on high alert. In civilian areas, panic spread. The New York Times and Al Jazeera noted the scale as the largest military clash between the two nuclear neighbors in years. Social media brimmed with calls for war, while cooler voices feared catastrophe. ICG analysts called the confrontation “the most dangerous confrontation in decades”. Civil society and some political figures in both countries quietly urged de-escalation, warning that a full-scale war would be disastrous.

Ceasefire and Current Situation

On 11 May 2025, after four days of pitched conflict, a U.S.-brokered ceasefire was announced. Behind the scenes, U.S. President Trump and Secretary of State were reported to have pressed both leaders to stand down. Republican Senator Marco Rubio also lobbied Delhi and Islamabad to halt. The official line from Delhi and Islamabad was the same, new hostilities would cease immediately at 0900 GMT on 12 May, and both sides agreed to diplomatic talks soon. The White House issued a joint statement welcoming the truce.

The fragile truce largely held over the next week. A Pakistani news outlet reported only minor violations, each side accusing the other of firing to claim pinprick retaliations. After the ceasefire, India conducted an internal investigation into the Pahalgam attack. By mid-May, Delhi publicly accused Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), a Pakistan-based militant group, of ordering the Pahalgam killings, and targeted suspected operatives in Pakistani Kashmir. Pakistan, for its part, denied harboring terrorists and renewed calls for dialogue on Kashmir. U.S. officials emphasize that a lasting solution will not come from military pressure. The ceasefire offered a pause, not a settlement.

Underlying Causes and Analysis

The April-May 2025 crisis was driven by multiple overlapping factors:

Persistent Kashmir Dispute: The core grievance remains unresolved status. Kashmir’s majority-Muslim population has long sought more autonomy or self-determination. India’s moves (2019 abrogation, settlement laws) are viewed by many Kashmiris as permanent changes to the region’s identity. ICG notes that policies which bypass local consent have “festered” resentment. When militants strike in Kashmir (or kill tourists), they tap into this context; their attacks intend to provoke Indian reprisals that might inflame local opinion further.

Proxy Conflict and Militancy: Both India and Pakistan accuse the other of sponsoring violence in Kashmir. India typically blames groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba or Jaish-e-Mohammed (and their associated fronts like The Resistance Front) as proxies of Pakistan. The TRF, linked to LeT, claimed the Pahalgam attack and later denied it. India alleged these groups attacked on Pakistan’s orders. Pakistan denies this, saying any Kashmiri insurgency is homegrown resistance to Indian policies. However, evidence is scant, so suspicion and rhetoric spiral easily. This acrimony means one side’s “militant” is the other side’s “freedom fighter,” complicating any negotiations.

While reports indicate that Pakistan has indeed offered a free and fair international inquiry into the Pahalgam attack, India has so far been reluctant to agree to such a probe. Following the deadly incident on April 22, 2025, Pakistani officials, including the Prime Minister and Ambassador to the US, publicly stated their willingness to support a neutral, transparent, and credible investigation, potentially under UN auspices or with the involvement of major global powers. They have questioned India's allegations against Pakistan, citing a lack of concrete evidence despite India's swift accusations. However, India has not responded positively to these offers and has instead pursued its own investigation, with initial reports from its National Investigation Agency (NIA) already linking the attack to Pakistan-based elements. This reluctance from India to accept an international inquiry suggests a preference for its own investigative processes and conclusions regarding the incident.

Domestic Politics: In democracies with contested leadership, political crises abroad can become domestic issues. In Pakistan’s election turmoil, hawkish voices sought to rally nationalism by highlighting the Kashmir issue. Security hardliners and opposition figures accused the government of weakness, expecting retaliation against India. Similarly, in India’s nationalist politics, politicians from Modi’s BJP faced pressure to appear tough. Some commentators note that Indian authorities had little incentive to ease tensions before elections. Conversely, Pakistan’s army may tolerate hardline sentiment at home (perhaps even through fear of street protests), though official support for a cross-border attack could backfire with international consequences.

International Dynamics: The crisis was shaped by U.S. and global involvement. The U.S., deepening ties with both countries, quickly mediated to defuse the conflict. Vice President Vance and others signaled they would not abandon India after the terrorist attack (addressing Indian skepticism), yet also nudged Pakistan to contain militants. Other powers (China, Russia, EU) have less direct leverage, but voiced support for calm. Importantly, the ease of global travel and communications means.

Bilateral Failures: Formal dialogue between India and Pakistan has been stalled for years, especially on Kashmir. Confidence-building measures (like the 2003 ceasefire agreement, bus services, trade) were eroded by earlier conflicts (e.g. 2019 Pulwama-Balakot clashes). Both sides say they are open to talks “with conditions,” but there is deep mistrust. Noted with great concern that even as nuclear arms have been tested (India 1974; Pakistan 1998), communication channels remain minimal. Without any institutional mechanism to manage crises (no hotlines or third-party guarantors currently active), incidents escalate quickly.

Overall, the April-May 2025 crisis reflects a bitter cycle, militant attack ⇒ public outrage in India ⇒ military retaliation ⇒ Pakistani reaction ⇒ politics ⇒ last-minute ceasefire. This cycle has repeated (on a smaller scale) in 2016, 2019, 2021, etc. The fear is that the next incident, if no safeguards are put in place, could be even larger.

Policy Recommendations

To prevent future flare-ups and stabilize the region, policymakers should act on several fronts:

For India:

In light of Pakistan's offer of an independent international inquiry into the Pahalgam attack. This approach would not only adhere to principles of justice but also serve to de-escalate tensions and avoid inflaming civilian sentiment, both within both sides of Kashmir and internationally. While considering Pakistan's offer, India should weigh the credibility and scope of such an inquiry against its own established investigative mechanisms, ensuring any path forward guarantees a transparent and conclusive determination of responsibility for the attack.

Strengthen crisis communication channels. Reopen military communication hotlines with Pakistan to manage cross-border incidents in real time (e.g. if gunfire starts).

Address Kashmiri grievances. Follow through on the India’s Supreme Court’s mandate by holding timely regional and local elections in Indian held Kashmir. Restore a legitimate local government, which would give Kashmiris a political stake. Simultaneously, engage local leaders (including moderate pro-India figures and even reasonable former separatists) in dialogue about autonomy, development, and security. By allowing Kashmiri voices, Delhi could undercut support for militancy.

Publicly reject extremism. The Indian government should isolate fringe voices calling for indiscriminate revenge. It can commit to the ceasefire terms and even propose confidence-building measures (for example, unblocking trade channels, inviting discussions on counter-terrorism coordination under UN or other frameworks).

For Pakistan:

Crack down on militant networks. While Pakistan denies state involvement in Kashmir militancy, it must act decisively against any groups operating from its territory. Even a perception of tolerance can provoke Indian action. Evidence-sharing with India or third parties (e.g. UN monitors) could help build trust.

Balance domestic politics. Pakistan’s leaders should avoid inflaming anti-India rhetoric or street mobilizations. Instead, use diplomatic channels to express concerns. The powerful army and civilian leadership must ensure that policy (including the Afghanistan repatriations) does not backfire by pushing militants back into Indian Kashmir or fueling sectarian tensions internally.

Engage internationally. Islamabad should welcome international mediation rather than framing it as interference. It can also seek ways to ease border tensions (e.g. re-opening the Line of Control crossing in Kashmir for civilian trade or pilgrimage under tight security). Showing willingness to separate militant claims from state policy will help Pakistan’s global standing.

For International Actors (U.S., China, UN, etc.):

Sustain diplomatic pressure. The U.S. and EU should keep encouraging both sides to honor the ceasefire and resume talks. Quick U.S. engagement was key to the May 2025 truce, and continued U.S.-led shuttle diplomacy can help avoid relapse. Chinese influence over Pakistan can be used privately to discourage aggressive posturing. All outsiders should emphasize the dire risks of a nuclear exchange.

Support dialogue frameworks. The UN or neutral countries could offer to mediate low-profile Track-II talks on counter-terrorism or humanitarian issues (cataracts in Indus treaty, Kashmir refugees, etc.) as a step toward broader discussions.

Address root causes. Global actors should back development and confidence-building in Kashmir. For example, they can fund cross-border cultural exchanges or joint projects (e.g. healthcare clinics) to build person-to-person ties. They should also spotlight and sanction violations, if, say, Pakistan is found backing a banned group, appropriate pressure (financial or diplomatic) might be applied to dissuade escalation.

Conclusion

The April–May 2025 standoff between India and Pakistan was a stark reminder that the Kashmir conflict remains highly volatile. Decades of unresolved disputes, political crises, and mutual distrust erupted in violence that nearly spiraled out of control. The ceasefire is welcome, but without addressing the underlying issues, restoring Kashmiri political rights, curbing militant proxies, and reviving dialogue, the truce may be fleeting. As the International community emphasizes, both nuclear-armed neighbors urgently need an “off-ramp” with third-party help to ease tensions. Concerted efforts by India, Pakistan and the international community are required to break the cycle of attack and revenge, and to build mechanisms that prevent the next crisis from spiraling out of control.

About the Author: Tahir Ali Shah is a humanitarian professional with over 20 years of experience managing protection and development programs across South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. He has worked extensively in refugee response, child protection, and humanitarian advocacy. He can be reached at tshaha@gmail.com